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Abstract 
Firm level data from financial statements for nearly 8,000 listed companies in 
22 emerging and 22 developed countries over the period 1994-00 are examined.  
Capital structure, asset structure, rates of return and financing patterns are 
compared across countries and over time.  Generally, there are as many 
similarities as differences between the two groups.  The differences include 
lower levels of debt to finance assets and lower levels of current assets in 
emerging markets compared with developed countries.  Returns on assets, 
expressed in local currency, are comparable in the two groups but appear more 
volatile in emerging markets. 
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The main purpose of this paper is to investigate, to help to establish stylised 
facts and, where possible, to explain differences between emerging market 
(EM) corporations and developed market (DM) corporations with respect to 
accounting ratios, derived from balance sheets and income statements for 
individual corporations. In addition to the accounting variables such as the 
structure of corporate liabilities (short-term and long-term), we examine the size 
distribution of corporations, their capital structures as well as the financing of 
corporate growth in the two groups of countries. A study of these variables for 
developing countries is interesting in its own right, but in order to put this into 
perspective, a comparison with advanced countries is particularly valuable. 
 
The current public interest in corporate finance and corporate behavior in 
emerging markets is a recent phenomenon that arose out of the East Asian crisis 
and the view that the ‘deeper causes’ of the crisis lay in the Asian way of doing 
business
1. That view suggested that poor corporate governance, inadequate 
competition, high leverage and crony capitalism led to disregard for profits, 
over-investment and exploitation of minority shareholders. Hence, in order to 
forestall future crises, G-7 countries under the New International Financial 
Architecture, have proposed, interalia, reform of the corporate system in 
emerging markets.
2 Whether or not this thesis is correct, corporate reform in 
emerging markets is now on the national and international agenda.   
Implementing appropriate reforms, however, requires a body of empirical 
knowledge that is only now beginning to emerge. This paper attempts to further 
that knowledge. 
 
Our contribution in this paper relies in reporting on the results of analysis of 
corporate financial statements of nearly 8,000 companies in 44 countries over 
the period 1995-00.  Although we have a large body of data, it is important to 
recognize that the sample is not a random selection from each of the countries 
involved and that, therefore, interpretation of any results must incorporate the 
nature of the sample and any influence that its selection might have on the 
results.  For that reason, we also draw on what is known about the countries and 
the sectoral composition of the sample when describing our findings. 
 
At one level, the questions addressed in this paper are simple. For example, how 
does a typical company in an emerging market finance growth, from internal or 
external sources? Are firms in emerging markets larger or smaller than their 
developed market counterparts? Are asset and capital structures in emerging 
markets fundamentally different from those observed in developed markets?   
However, interpretation of the empirical answers to these questions is far from 2 
being straightforward owing, in part, to the sample issues raised above, as well 
as the ambiguities that exist in the relevant theoretical models. 
 
The findings are both expected and unexpected. We find that EM firms are 
generally smaller than their DM counterparts. We also find that EM firms use 
lower levels of debt currently, but the debt level has declined in recent years 
from much higher levels previously. We also find that EM firms hold higher 
levels of fixed assets (relative to total assets) than do DM firms. The evidence 
also shows that returns on assets and equity have been more volatile for EM 
than for DM firms and that returns have been generally lower. Finally, the 
analysis shows that EM firms have used much higher levels of external equity 
to finance growth than DM firms. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section outlines a 
series of analytical issues that one needs to consider when comparing corporate 
financial choices and outcomes in an international context. That is followed by 
a data description and the empirical results. The final section comprises a 
summary, conclusions and policy implications. 
 
II.    Conceptual Issues 
 
Should statistics generated from financial statements about, for example, capital 
structure and profitability, systematically differ across countries? What does 
economic theory predict? At one level theory suggests that differences should 
be immaterial if all countries are subject to the full rigors of competition and 
market forces. Theory, however, recognises that, despite vigorous market 
forces, there may be specific factors that result in differences. For example, the 
sectoral composition of firms might differ across countries and, owing to risks 
inherent in a sector, this might result in different corporate choices and 
outcomes. Other factors that influence corporate outcomes are the macro-
economic environment, the regulatory system, institutions (e.g. the legal system 
and governance) and the preferences of and options available to investors. For 
these reasons one should not be surprised to find inter-country differences in 
corporate finance and corporate behavior. In line with this, interpretation of 
observed behavior therefore requires knowledge of careful attention to these 
factors. 
 
In the particular case of comparing emerging and developed markets, which is 
the focus of this paper, there are important environmental differences that are 
pertinent to the analysis. First, compared with DMs most markets in EMs would 
be expected to be more imperfect and incomplete, including the product market, 
the labor market, and particularly the capital market.  Second, DM corporations 3 
tend to be family owned and there is little separation of ownership and control 
of the kind found in Anglo-Saxon corporations. Third, domestically-owned 
business groups and conglomerates dominate corporate structures in many EMs. 
These conglomerates are quite different in their origin and character than those 
found in advanced countries and, therefore, their behavior might be different.  
Fourth, there are differences between EMs and DMs in regulation, in the 




In view of these particular features of DMs, it would be difficult to maintain a 
priori the hypothesis of no difference between the characteristics of the 
corporations in the two groups of countries. Differences with respect to any 
particular aspect, such as profitability or the size distribution of firms, would 
depend on the relative significance of the above factors. We illustrate this by 
considering the case of financing of corporate growth. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that even if the managers, acting as 
agents for owners, are rational shareholder wealth maximizers, because of 
asymmetric information between them and the investing public, a pecking order 
of finance (in which internal equity is first choice, followed by debt and then, as 
a last resort, external equity) would be optimal. This theoretical analysis should 
be equally applicable in both groups of countries. However, because EM 
corporations, even large listed ones, are often family controlled and these 
families are averse to losing control, this may impose an additional reason to 
avoid external equity finance. One would therefore expect to find in EM 
corporations even more emphasis on internal equity finance. In addition, 
subsidised debt from government-controlled lenders might lead to greater use of 
debt than equity, relegating external equity to a distant third place. 
 
Another conceptual issue regarding differences between the two groups of 
countries that require attention is that of accounting standards and reporting 
requirements. In light of recent scandals in the US and other DMs, the 
superiority of DM accounting is now much less obvious. Moreover, it is 
important to note that our data for EMs pertains to listed companies where, 
increasingly, international standards are being applied. Despite that, to the 
extent that EMs are more inflationary, their accounting data, unless adjusted, 
could be distorted. For most countries in our sample, however, inflation is not 
an issue and, where inflation is a problem, adjustments are the norm.
4 Finally, 
although many of the hypotheses we address are economic in nature and 
accounting data are not designed to deal directly with those economic issues, we 
must accept that accounting data are all that are available and adjust our 
interpretation of the results accordingly. Dealing specifically with issues 4 
associated with inter-country accounting differences must be considered beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
 
III.   Data Description 
 
The data consist of various accounts taken from the financial statements of 
listed companies, as reported by BVD in their May 2002 CD-ROM.  BVD 
attempts to provide data on as many companies as possible for each country, 
although statistics on coverage (as measured by percentage of each market) are 
not available.  Over time, their sample has grown and this growth has an 
influence on the data used in this study.  The sample period used in much of the 
work that follows is 1994-2000.   Data for earlier years is available for some 
companies, but the number of companies with data prior to 1994 declines, 
especially for some of the emerging markets.  With that decline, one is usually 
left with results only for the larger companies in each market, which could bias 
the results.  Data is also available for 2001 for some companies but, owing to a 
lag in reporting, the number of companies drops by nearly 40 percent from what 
was reported for 2000.  For that reason the sample period is ended at 2000. 
 
Table 1 presents the number of companies for each year for each country, with 
the table divided between developed and emerging markets.
5  In total there are 
44 countries represented in the sample: 22 developed markets and 22 emerging 
markets.  For the year 2000, there is a total of 7,968 companies in the sample, 
which is down 8 percent from what was reported in 1999, most likely reflecting 
lags in reporting as the number of companies has increased in each year except 
2000. Over the duration of the sample period the number of reported companies 
has increased by 82 percent; the rate of increase in both groups of countries was 
large, but the increase in the developed markets (84 percent) exceeded the rate 
of increase in the emerging markets (75 percent). 
 
The number of companies reported in Table 1 is well below the total number of 
listed companies in these markets, as reported in Standard and Poor’s (2001).  
For 2000, S&P reports a total of 25,253 listed companies in all emerging 
markets, compared to a total of only 23,996 for developed markets.  Both of 
these numbers have increased since 1994; the emerging markets universe 
increased by 76 percent and the developed market total increased by 39 percent.  
Clearly, the BVD data has far to go before it provides complete coverage of 
these markets. 5 
Table 1.  Number of Companies by Country and Year 
 
 
Developed Markets  2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
AUSTRALIA 84  92 94 80 81 78  72
AUSTRIA 45  49 52 47 41 36  33
BELGIUM 68  72 65 55 43 39  38
BERMUDA 38  42 32 31 28 24  23
CANADA 242  286 274 182 176 151 118
CAYMAN ISLANDS  10  8 10 7 6 6  6
DENMARK 70  78 77 73 68 63  61
FINLAND 66  67 58 40 32 26  26
FRANCE 335  359 308 253 224 196  177
GERMANY 345  382 348 270 242 218  212
GREECE 43  53 55 51 51 37  26
IRELAND 22  24 23 22 20 16  17
ITALY 79  81 65 62 60 47  30
JAPAN 1,163  1,540 1,536 1,323 1,177 413  344
NETHERLANDS 86  95 95 87 78 66  57
NORWAY 35  44 46 40 32 27  24
SINGAPORE 121  149 153 124 91 60  62
SPAIN 47  48 46 30 30 20  18
SWEDEN 105  119 127 106 95 76  60
SWITZERLAND 119  125 124 109 102 88  70
UNITED KINGDOM  460  490 557 545 494 476  425
UNITED STATES  2,572  2,510 2,108 1,902 1,783 1,604  1,443
Group Total  6,155  6,713 6,253 5,439 4,954 3,767  3,342
    
Emerging Markets    
ARGENTINA 21  20 9 7 11 10  9
BRAZIL 117  97 89 57 39 31 
CHILE 40  68 69 70 64 56  53
COLOMBIA 50  10 19 41 11 9  8
CZECH 73  63 86 68 39 24  14
HONG KONG  132  157 172 164 153 125  102
HUNGARY 13  17 10 5 5 3  2
INDIA 75  114 176 158 71 48  48
INDONESIA 6  15 27 25 25 26  24
ISRAEL 57  56 39 25 13 11  9
KOREA 779  751 735 705 650 619  533
MALAYSIA 142  207 204 184 205 189  136
MEXICO 40  45 42 31 28 38  31
PAKISTAN 8  11 12 7 5 4  2
PERU 64  68 65 62 3 2  1
P H I L I P P I N E S  8   57465   5
POLAND 20  29 26 10 5 1  1
SOUTH AFRICA  36  69 73 60 39 17  13
TAIWAN 112  95 92 65 30 20  16
THAILAND 9  19 29 27 28 24  21
T U R K E Y  2   26677   5
VENEZUELA 9  8 17 3 3 4  3
Group Total  1,813  1,926 2,004 1,784 1,440 1,273  1,036
    




About 77 percent of the companies were in developed markets in the year 2000, 
with the US alone representing 32 percent of the total.  Other significant 
developed countries in the sample include Japan and the UK; Germany, France 
and Canada have relatively fewer companies.  These six countries together 
represent 61 percent of the total sample for 2000.  Among the emerging 
markets, Korea had by far the largest number of companies in the sample: 779.  
No other emerging market comes close to this number, with Malaysia and its 
142 companies a distant second place. 
 
Note that the disparity in the number of companies between developed and 
emerging markets in this sample is also matched by the differences in their 
market capitalizations.  In 1994 total world stock market capitalization was 
$15.1 trillion, of which EM countries represented just $1.9 trillion, or 13 percent 
(Standard and Poor’s (2002)).  By 2000 the disparity between the two groups of 
countries had grown even wider, with total market capitalization growing to 
$32.3 trillion, of which emerging markets represented just $2.7 trillion, or 8 
percent.  Taking market capitalization as a reference, emerging markets are 
more than adequately represented in this sample.  
 
Companies were sorted into 8 industrial sectors using NAICS codes as reported 
by BVD.  Those sectors are: chemicals, food and beverages, industrial and 
consumer products, non-metallic minerals, plastics and rubber, primary metals, 
pulp and paper, and textiles, apparel and leather. Companies in the financial 
sector, as well as services and utilities, were excluded from the sample in order 
to avoid issues related to peculiarities in their reporting and operations relative 
to manufacturing companies.  A summary of the number of companies in each 
sector in year 2000 is presented in Table 2.  Globally, 55 percent of the sample 
companies is classified as Industrial and Consumer Products, a sector 
classification that includes a range of products, including machinery, electronics 
goods, automobiles and general consumer goods.  A distant second in number 
of companies is chemicals, which accounts for 13 percent of the total.  Pulp and 
paper has the smallest number of companies, 229, representing 3 percent of the 
global total. The distribution of companies across sectors is roughly comparable 
in both the developed and emerging markets, although there are less industrial 
and consumer products companies in emerging markets (43 percent) than in 
developed markets (58 percent), with the difference spread across a number of 
sectors.  
7




*  indicates rejection of the hypothesis of equal medians at the 5 percent level. 
  # of Companies  % of Total (by #)  Mean Total Assets ($ millions)  Median Total Assets ($ millions) 
Sector Developed  Emerging Global  Developed Emerging Global Developed Emerging Global Developed Emerging Global 
Chemicals  740  289 1,029 12% 16% 13% 2,743  1,020  2,259  187  120       163* 
Food & Beverages  533  194 727 9% 11% 9% 1,892  572  1,539  214  187       209 
Industrial Products  3,568  776 4,344 58% 43% 55% 1,541  436  1,344  102  63       107* 
Non-metallic Minerals  210  110 320 3% 6% 4% 1,423  636  1,153  119  173       172 
Plastics & Rubber  207  56 263 3% 3% 3%  764  510  710  172  87       117 
Primary Metals  271  127 398 4% 7% 5% 1,870  966  1,581  315  154       252* 
Pulp & Paper  160  63 223 3% 3% 3% 2,092  505  1,644  414  133       277* 
Textiles  466  198 664 8% 11% 8%  395  220  343  92  70         88 
Total  6,155  1,813 7,968 100% 100% 100% 1,628  574  1,388  139  93       126   8
IV.   Empirical Analysis 
 
A.  Size Distribution of Firms 
 
The size of a company, as measured by the total assets on the balance 
sheet, has potentially important implications. For example, in some 
sectors size is a determinant of cost structure, as certain technologies 
require that output be above a minimum threshold in order to be 
competitive. Even without technological constraints, larger firms may 
have lower net costs as administrative costs are amortized over larger 
amounts of output. In either case, one might expect emerging market 
companies to be at a disadvantage, especially with respect to the larger 
developed markets where overall demand for products may be higher.  
Consequently, one might expect to see smaller companies in emerging 
markets and this might have an impact on their competitiveness. 
 
An alternative view is that size, especially as measured by total assets, is 
not important. The argument here is that firms exploit two sets of assets 
in their operations: those that are purchased and reside on their balance 
sheet; and those that are represented by the human capital that they 
employ. If human capital is more important in developed than developing 
countries, then one might expect to see that reflected in the size of 
companies as measured by total assets. 
 
There is an additional complicating factor, which is the extent to which 
the firms in any given country are subject to competition. In a large 
market, such as the US, domestic competition alone might force 
companies to adopt an optimal technology and that might determine size.  
But in smaller and less open markets, where competition is limited, size 
could reflect factors other than competition. In small, but open 
economies, firms would adjust to the comparative advantages of the local 
resources, and those factors, together with technological considerations, 
would determine size. 
 
The empirical evidence on size in the academic literature is limited.   
Roberts and Tybout (1991) examine a sample of Chilean and Colombian 
companies and the impact that trade liberalization had on their size, as 
measured by number of employees at the plant level. Their review of the 
theory suggests that the impact of trade openness should be for 
production rationalization, which suggests increases in size. In fact, they 
find that plant size is reduced when import competition increases and that 
the impact increases over time. Note that this effect is measured at the 
plant and not the company level.   9
 
Table 2 provides a first glimpse at the size of the companies in the 
sample. Globally, the average company had total assets in the year 2000 
of $1.4 billion, but average size in the sample varies greatly across 
sectors, with chemicals having by far the largest average total assets and 
textiles the smallest. As measured by average total assets, the emerging 
market companies are only about 35 percent the size of their developed 
market counterparts. In this sample, however, mean size is not a good 
indicator of the overall sample owing to an asymmetric distribution of 
size across companies. Under these circumstances, the median paints a 
different picture, as shown in the last three columns of the table. Under 
that measure the emerging market companies are not much different from 
their developed market counterparts, and in a few sectors – note in 
particular non-metallic minerals – the emerging market companies are 
larger. Owing to the significant differences between mean and median 
values in this sample, much of what follows will concentrate on median 
values. 
 
Table 3 presents the median value of total assets for each country by year.  
Starting with the global mean (which is the average of the medians across 
countries by year), we see that the global median company in 2000 was 
$189 million, down from $328 million in 1994. This decline likely 
reflects the expansion in the number of companies in the sample over 
time. Initially, the largest and most liquid companies were included in the 
database. Over time, the companies that were added were smaller, pulling 
down the median value. One can see a similar pattern for the DM sample.  
For the emerging markets, the pattern over time is more complicated; 
median company size rises through 1997 and then falls sharply in 1998, 
with further declines through 2000. A large part of the drop in value in 
1998 must reflect the Asia crisis and coincident depreciation of the Asian 
currencies. As these values are reported in US$ and given the large 
contingent of Asian companies in the sample, one should expect to see a 
currency impact at that time. Not all of the impact is from Asia, however; 
note the decline in the median value for Venezuela in 1998, which has a 
significant impact on the cross-country mean. Also, note that the median 
value in Korea changed very little, despite a sharp drop in the value of the 
Won in 1998. 
 
Ignoring the time series dimension, there are remarkable similarities 
between the two samples of countries. In the year 2000, for example, the 
difference in the mean value (of the medians) of the emerging markets 
sample and the developed markets sample is a mere $24 million, with the 
DM value larger than the EM value. In fact, the DM median exceeds the   10
EM median in all years, although the difference has declined over time.  
Looking deeper at individual countries, one can see that the median size 
in several EM countries is well in excess of that of the larger DM 
countries. For example, Mexico, which had 40 companies in the sample 
in 2000, has a median size of $840 million, nearly four times the US 
median value and well above that of any DM country. Also note, 
however, that Peru, which has a sample of 64 companies in 2000, had a 
median value of only $26 million, far below that of any DM country. 
Perhaps sector composition accounts for these country differences. 
 
While the median values are useful for summarizing the sample, they also 
hide much of the variation that occurs across the sample. Some of that 
variation is revealed in Figure 1, which presents a histogram of total 
assets for the year 2000 for both the EM and DM pooled samples. The 
figure confirms that the EM sample is much like the DM sample, but it 
does contain more small companies and fewer large companies. More 
than 35 percent of the EM sample companies have total assets of $50 
million or less, compared to a bit more than 25 percent for the DM 
sample. At the other extreme, only slightly more than 10 percent of the 
EM sample companies have total assets over $1 billion, compared to 
about 18 percent for the DM sample. Except for these extremes, the two 




Table 3 provides a simple measure of size – median total assets – but that 
measure suffers from trying to explain the total distribution of firms in a 
single statistic. It also combines firms across industries within a single 
country. Given the potential importance for technology-related industry 
effects, accounting for industry composition within a country is 
important.  
 
This section reports results from a regression of total assets (expressed in 
natural log form for the year 2000) on a set of industry and country 
dummies.  The results provide industry and country mean values 
(adjusted for industry effects), as well as a statistical test of differences 
across industries and countries.  Those results are presented in Table 4.  
In the table the United States and the Industrial and Consumer Products 
industries are taken as the base levels against which all other industries 
and countries are measured.  Note that the regression employed a total of 
3,360 companies and had an overall R
2 of 21.6 percent.
6 
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Starting with the industry coefficients, one sees that 5 of the 7 industries 
have coefficients that are significantly larger than the base industry; only 
one industry – textiles – has a lower value.  To give an order of 
magnitude to these coefficients, the mean value of total assets in the base 
industry/country is $214 million.  In the textiles industry that value is 
reduced to $149 million, about one third less. Non-metallic minerals is 
the largest industry, with mean value of $505 million. 
 
Within the developed markets 9 of the 22 countries have mean values 
(after adjusting for industry effects) that differ statistically from the base 
case.  Only two of those, the UK and Bermuda, have a value that is below 
the base case, with values of $102 million for Bermuda and $123 million 
for the UK.  The other 7 countries have mean values that are above the 
base case.  Japan has the largest companies, with mean value of $3.17 
billion after adjusting for industry effects.  Note, however, that country 
size does not correlate well with firm size.  Switzerland, which is tiny in 
GDP terms, has significantly larger companies, on average, to the US 
base case; the same is true in Ireland.  Perhaps this difference reflects the 
much larger sample from the US, which allows many smaller companies 
to be included in the sample. 
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Table 3.  Median Assets (USD millions) by Country and Year 
 
 
Developed  Markets  2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
AUSTRALIA    194 158 133 216 205    190 223 
AUSTRIA    191 181 169 155 188    221 207 
BELGIUM    143 139 157 183 236    279 244 
BERMUDA    115 108 109 114 129    135 133 
CANADA   83  92  102   119  101   117  136 
CAYMAN ISLANDS   361  363  252  160  175   103  102 
DENMARK    179 166 157 134 135    151 127 
FINLAND   147  138  307  706  1,091   1,526  1,389 
FRANCE    102  88 120 142 198    241 244 
GERMANY    148   137  184  225  304   422  333 
GREECE    106 99 56 54 51    47 63 
IRELAND    417 386 365 356 436    398 378 
ITALY   340  344  391  360  375    491  1,265 
JAPAN   185  316  265  198  237   1,215  1,569 
NETHERLANDS    236 173 227 200 236    292 243 
NORWAY   122  103  140  106  87    96  117 
SINGAPORE   89  80  72  77  87   107  81 
SPAIN    318 294 317 375 387    339 303 
SWEDEN    100 105 118 149 177    240 316 
SWITZERLAND    312 251 297 288 326    339 412 
UNITED KINGDOM   83  83  84  79  84   77  83 
UNITED STATES   116  90  94  89  80   75  70 
Group Median  139  145 148 139 147 165  159
    
Emerging Markets          
ARGENTINA    267 516  1,237 904 754    968 984 
BRAZIL   303  387  549  979  895   1,177   -
CHILE   190  129  125  125  112    102  85 
COLOMBIA    113 202 157 169 361    337 249 
CZECH   26  28  43  40  43   47  31 
HONG KONG   128  116  111 119 119    110 120 
HUNGARY   117  88  104  138 88    60 56 
INDIA    168 141 115 119 183    193 285 
INDONESIA   322  261  212 231 281    295 224 
ISRAEL    109  86 201 218 217    302 431 
KOREA   57  51  45  42  61   59  46 
MALAYSIA   74  55  50  57  72   67  89 
MEXICO   840  650  702  1,157  1,250    659  743 
PAKISTAN   30  27  60  56  59   114  124 
PERU   26  22  24  30  30   84  148 
PHILIPPINES    116 83  239  1,497 65    70 43 
POLAND   69  52  51  51  189   75  55 
SOUTH AFRICA   113  58  65  104  180   957  1,557 
TAIWAN    446 502 422 443 965    569 368 
THAILAND    299 172  95  93 183    162 126 
TURKEY   156  38  82  67  61    54  134 
VENEZUELA   277  326  102  1,054  923   990   511 
Group Median  93  83 80 77 99 92  81
P-value (1)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Global Median  126  127 128 121 134 139  132
 
 
(1)  P-value presents the results of a test for equality of medians across the two country groups.   
  P-values less then 0.05 reject equality at the 5 percent level. 
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The emerging markets present a somewhat differ picture, with 11 of 19 
emerging markets having coefficients that are statistically different from 
the base case.  Interestingly, five of those countries have mean values that 
are above the base case.  Taiwan has the largest companies (ignoring 
Venezuela which has a small sample and a single large chemical 
company), with an average value of $895 million, followed by Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina and Israel.  In addition, 6 countries had smaller 
companies on average, with the Czech Republic the smallest with mean 
value of $49 million. 
 
Unfortunately, interpreting the regression results in Table 4 in terms of 
any of the logical arguments presented above on size determination is 
difficult as there are many dimensions to be taken into consideration.  In 
Korea, for example, where firms are subjected to fierce domestic 
competition and export success is important, firms are generally smaller 
than average.  In contrast, in Taiwan, under similarly competitive 
circumstances, firms are larger than average.  In addition to possible 
competition effects, sample characteristics also need to be taken into 
consideration.  The larger size of Taiwanese firms may reflect the fact 
that there are far fewer of them in the sample, whereas a large number of 
Korean companies may reduce their average size.  Clearly, interpretation 
of the results is difficult.
7 
 
This regression framework also provides evidence on the relative 
importance of country and sector effects on company size.  To assess 
these effects, the regression was re-estimated with only country and only 
industry variables.  The results, not reported, show that of the total 
explained variation in the regression reported in Table 4, nearly 85 
percent of that amount is accounted for by country effects alone.  The 
framework also permits one to examine the extent to which the industry 
effects are peculiar to either the developed or emerging market 
companies.  Those results, also not reported, show that the industry 
effects reported in Table 4 do not change when emerging market industry 
dummy variables are introduced into the regression, nor do the additional 
variables have significant coefficients, suggesting that industry effects are 
equal in both size and significance in both sets of countries. 
 
Finally, note that specific firm effects could be an important component 
of size determination.  For example, superior management would result in 
business success and larger size.  Firm-specific effects, however, are 
absent from our specification owing to the decision to examine the size 
distribution at a single point in time.   14
Table 4.  Regression: Ln (Total Assets 2000) on Country & Sector Dummies 
 
 
           
 #  Obs  R
2       
 3360  0.216         
           
 Beta  T-Statistic         
Constant 12.273 199.39        
        
Chemicals 0.707 6.93        
Food & Beverages  0.592 5.38        
Nonmetallic Minerals  0.860 5.26        
Plastics & Rubber  0.279 1.52        
Primary Metals  0.686 5.51        
Pulp & Paper  0.667 3.83        
Textiles -0.358 -3.53       
        
Developed Markets    Emerging Markets    
AUSTRALIA -0.365 -1.56   ARGENTINA  0.766  2.73
AUSTRIA 0.162 0.66   BRAZIL  1.076  4.01
BELGIUM 0.120 0.45   CHILE  -0.632  -1.74
BERMUDA -0.737 -2.13   COLOMBIA  -0.807  -2.08
CANADA -0.057 -0.29   CZECH    -1.473  -2.74
CAYMAN ISLANDS  0.044 0.07   HONG KONG  -0.415  -2.51
DENMARK -0.204 -0.87   HUNGARY  -1.436  -3.73
FINLAND 1.436 3.46   INDIA  0.207  0.56
FRANCE 0.319 1.85   INDONESIA  0.387  0.82
GERMANY 0.535 3.29   ISRAEL  0.676  1.46
GREECE -0.405 -1.37   KOREA  -1.255  -14.13
IRELAND 0.863 3.25   MALAYSIA  -0.975  -5.90
ITALY 1.335 3.76   MEXICO  1.036  4.27
JAPAN 2.697 19.42   PHILIPPINES  -0.691  -0.75
NETHERLANDS 0.830 2.74   SOUTH  AFRICA  0.779  2.20
NORWAY 0.393 0.89   TAIWAN  1.432  4.45
SINGAPORE -0.231 -0.90   THAILAND  -0.139  -0.35
SPAIN 0.595 1.64   TURKEY  -2.413  -1.22
SWEDEN 0.446 1.75   VENEZUELA  1.621  1.14
SWITZERLAND 0.673 3.54        
UNITED KINGDOM  -0.550 -4.56        
 
 
Evolution of Firm Size over Time 
 
A very important question for economic analysis and public policy is that 
of the evolution of the size distribution of firms over time and its 
implications for competition and economic growth.  The question of 
growth becomes relevant since the study of firm size distribution over 
time essentially involves an analysis of the relationship between size and 
growth of firms.  Is this relationship the same for the two groups of 
countries? 
 
Economic theory suggests that the simplest hypothesis to start from is the 
one that regards firm growth to be a random phenomenon across firms.    15
The specific form of this hypothesis, the so called law of proportionate 
effects, asserts that all firms have the same chance of growing by a given 
percentage during any period of time.  If this law holds, it has powerful 
economic implications, including that there will be a relentless increase in 
industrial concentration over time.
8 
 
An economic rationale for testing this law using an entirely stochastic 
model of firm growth can be presented in the following terms.  It may be 
argued that firm growth depends on a multitude of factors, some of which 
make for positive growth, others for negative growth and they are 
independently randomly distributed.  It is difficult to estimate their 
individual effect, but the combined effect is to generate the stochastic 
relationship between size and growth of firms as manifest in the law of 
proportionate effects. 
 
From the perspective of economic analysis, a better theory would be one 
that postulates that firm growth is subject to both systematic and 
stochastic forces.  The former might be managerial quality or macro-
economic conditions.  In empirical terms, the law in this formulation can 
be tested by a regression of firm closing size on opening size.  A 
regression coefficient of one would indicate the equal growth rates across 
firms; a coefficient below one suggests convergence in size. 
 
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 5.  The main point 
that emerges relates to the slope coefficient.  In about half the countries in 
each group the slope coefficient is below one, suggesting that the two 
groups are not greatly different.  However, in about half the countries in 
each group large firm growth rates exceed or equal those of small firms, 
suggesting that, other things being equal, industrial concentration in these 
countries increased over this period.
9 
 
B. Capital Structure 
 
Capital structure has important implications for the vulnerability of firms 
to exogenous shocks.  And, as noted earlier, high leverage is thought to 
have contributed to the East Asian crisis.  Despite this importance, there 
is neither theoretical nor empirical consensus on the factors that drive 
corporate decisions on this matter.
10  In this section we examine the 
capital structures of our sample of firms and investigate similarities and 
differences between the two groups of countries.  16
Table 5:  Size and Growth: Regressions of firm level total assets (2000, log) on total 
assets (1995, log). 
 
Emerging Markets  α  Β  R
2  Observations 
Argentina 3.20  0.76  0.66  8 
Brazil -1.78  1.11  0.90  23 
Chile 3.26  0.73  *  0.71  26 
Colombia -1.22  1.07  0.98  6 
Czech Republic  7.58  0.31 *  -0.01  11 
Hong Kong  2.69  0.78  0.40  68 
Hungary -3.78  1.37  0.58  3 
India -3.87  1.28  *  0.92  14 
Indonesia -0.53  1.01  0.90  6 
Israel -3.14  1.27  0.91  5 
Korea 3.39  0.72  *  0.74  517 
Malaysia 1.87  0.84  *  0.65  103 
Mexico 1.86  0.91  *  0.97  31 
Philippine 0.95  0.94  0.84  4 
South Africa  -0.93  1.04  0.76  9 
Taiwan -0.50  1.08  0.88  19 
Thailand -5.12  1.41  0.79  4 
Venezuela -1.42  1.11  0.98  3 
 
Developed Markets         
Australia 1.96  0.85  *  0.77  57 
Austria 0.31  0.97    0.85  25 
Belgium 1.48  0.89    0.87  31 
Bermuda -2.85  1.24    0.50  14 
Canada 3.45  0.76    *  0.60  105 
Cayman Islands  -2.91  1.24   0.63  3 
Denmark 0.43  0.98    0.92  44 
Finland -0.68  1.06  0.95  17 
France -0.19  1.02    0.92  148 
Germany -0.54  1.04    0.80  164 
Greece 1.19  0.97  0.62  21 
Ireland 4.64  0.70  *  0.76  13 
Italy -0.63  1.07    0.89  32 
Japan 1.39  0.91  *  0.94  128 
Netherlands 0.87  0.95    0.87  43 
Norway 0.67  0.97    0.89  17 
Singapore 0.69  0.95    0.83  38 
Spain -1.15  1.11    0.87  18 
Sweden 3.04  0.79  *  0.86  57 
Switzerland 2.31  0.84  *  0.84  74 
United Kingdom  2.32  0.84 *  0.73  299 
United States  2.16  0.88 *  0.80  1150 
 
*  indicates significantly different from 1 at the 5 percent level. 
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Leverage: Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
 
Globally, the average company in the sample financed just over half of its 
balance sheet with liabilities, with very little variation in the level of 
liabilities over time for the global average (Table 6).  That global average, 
however, masks large variation across individual countries and, within 
those countries, across time.  Across the two major groupings of 
countries, debt levels were much higher in developed markets, which had 
a median ratio of total liabilities to total assets ranging from 49 percent 
(in 2000) to 62 percent (in 1994), with a steady decline following the 
1997 Asian crisis.  In contrast, the emerging markets group ratio 
fluctuated between 52 and 53 percent from year to year, with no obvious 
trend across time.  Those differences between countries are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level in all years. 
 
Even within these two major groupings one observes considerable 
variation.  Some of the lowest levels of debt in the developed markets are 
observed in the US, where the median company had ratio values of 41 
percent in 1996-97.  Those ratios increased over the next few years, 
however, ending the sample period at 45 percent, still well below the 
level of nearly all other developed markets.  Some countries saw debt 
levels drop over the sample.  For example, in Japan the ratio declined 
from 62 percent in 1994 to 55 percent in 2000, placing it below the 
developed country median.  The ratio for German companies also 
declined, but ended the period with a median value of 64 percent, well 
above the group median.  In other cases leverage increased, with the 
median Irish company increasing its leverage ratio from 60 percent in 
1994 to 68 percent in 2000, earning it the distinction of having the highest 
median leverage ratio in the entire developed market sample for that 
terminal year. 
 
There was also great variation across countries and over time in emerging 
markets.  Indonesia ended the sample period with by far the highest 
leverage ratio (89 percent), which was up sharply from its levels in the 
first three years of the sample.  Following the 1997 crisis leverage ratios 
soared in Indonesia as profits turned to losses, thereby eating up equity, 
with this effect compounded by foreign currency denominated debt being 
inflated by an especially weak currency and, possibly, by the large 
decline in the number of Indonesian companies in the sample. Clearly, 
however, the impact of the crisis was much different in Korea, which also 
experienced severe currency weakening, but where the leverage ratio was 
trimmed from a relatively high value of 72 percent in 1994 to a much 
more conservative 52 percent in 2000.  Thailand represents a third way,   18
with lower levels of debt in the early years of the sample, but where the 
crisis resulted in higher leverage ratios, but not nearly to the extent of 
Indonesia.  Finally, note that leverage ratios declined in Hong Kong 
following the crisis, but that they increased marginally in Taiwan, one of 
the few emerging markets in the region that did not experience extreme 
disruption to its economy at that time. 
 
Some other emerging market countries also produce interesting results.  
For example, in Venezuela, which had a weak financial sector throughout 
this sample period, leverage ratios were consistently low, although there 
was a sharp drop in 1995, likely reflecting the currency devaluation at 
that time.  Also notable is the trend in Brazil, which adopted its real 
program in 1994 and stabilized inflation, where the level of debt held by 
the median company climbed steadily from a below average value of 42 
percent in 1995 (the first year for which data are available) to an above 
average value of 62 percent in 2000.  Also note the increase in leverage in 
Pakistan following its 1998 economic hardships (and currency 
devaluation), as well as the increase in Poland and the Czech Republic 
over time as the financial systems in those countries developed and came 
closer to developed country standards.  In Turkey one observes relatively 
high levels of debt despite high inflation and correspondingly high levels 
of real interest rates.  These ratios for Turkey do raise the issue of 
inflation accounting and the impact that restatement of balance sheets has 
on ratios such as this. 
 
The use of median values in Table 6 paints a very different picture from 
what is obtained by using mean values, which suffer from the influence 
of large outliers.  Although mean values of the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets are not presented to conserve space, a few comments will 
highlight their difference with the medians reported in the table.   
Globally, mean values of the ratio do not differ significantly, with a 
global mean of 56 percent, compared to the 52 percent average median 
value reported in the table.  For some countries, however, there are large 
differences.  In Malaysia, for example, the mean value of the ratio for 
year 2000 is 86 percent, compared to a median value of 48 percent.  In 
many other countries the mean and median do not differ substantially, but 
in 8 countries the differences are large and always in the direction of 
lower median ratios than mean ratios. 
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Table 6.  Median Total Liabilities/Total Assets (%) by Country and Year 
 
 
Developed Markets  2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
AUSTRALIA 55 53 52 51 51 51  51
AUSTRIA 63 64 63 66 71 69  66
BELGIUM 57 56 60 62 59 56  58
BERMUDA 43 52 47 49 51 57  54
CANADA 48 48 49 48 47 50  52
CAYMAN ISLANDS  43 48 48 47 37 51  47
DENMARK 59 54 52 52 51 53  54
FINLAND 58 59 58 60 61 63  67
FRANCE 62 62 61 62 61 62  62
GERMANY 64 65 68 70 71 70  71
GREECE 57 55 57 58 56 55  56
IRELAND 68 65 65 60 64 62  60
ITALY 64 64 62 64 62 65  66
JAPAN 55 55 57 56 58 62  62
NETHERLANDS 61 64 60 59 59 62  58
NORWAY 58 54 56 55 56 56  59
SINGAPORE 46 47 52 49 49 44  45
SPAIN 56 56 52 50 47 58  60
SWEDEN 53 54 54 55 53 55  60
SWITZERLAND 54 54 57 56 58 60  60
UNITED KINGDOM  49 51 53 52 53 54  52
UNITES STATES  45 47 43 41 41 43  44
Group Median  52 53 53 52 52 53 53
   
Emerging Markets   
ARGENTINA 41 44 53 46 47 44  46
BRAZIL 62 57 51 52 50 42 
CHILE 43 40 42 41 41 40  39
COLOMBIA 34 34 43 30 38 37  33
CZECH REPUBLIC  45 49 47 45 40 41  35
HONG KONG  40 42 44 46 51 52  52
HUNGARY 35 37 30 23 23 29  42
INDIA 47 50 55 56 57 57  60
INDONESIA 89 70 76 71 57 51  54
ISRAEL 40 47 47 56 48 54  54
KOREA 52 56 66 72 71 72  72
MALAYSIA 48 48 50 49 48 51  47
MEXICO 56 49 46 52 50 52  51
PAKISTAN 63 72 59 56 56 68  61
PERU 49 48 48 47 34 28  19
PHILIPPINES 41 22 26 39 17 19  22
POLAND 44 48 43 26 16 15  14
SOUTH AFRICA  51 47 45 46 47 53  57
TAIWAN 47 44 43 44 41 34  36
THAILAND 62 61 54 72 62 56  52
TURKEY 62 68 59 54 63 61  48
VENEZUELA 34 38 33 27 30 31  53
Group Median  49 50 55 58 60 61  62
P-Value (1)  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Global Median  51  53  54  54  54   55   55 
 
 
(1)  P-value reports results for a test of median equality between the two country groups.   
  A value of less than 0,05 rejects equality at the 5 percent level. 
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Differences in medians across the different countries could, in part, 
represent different industry compositions.  To address this issue, Table 7 
reports a regression of the year 2000 ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
on a size factor
11 and a set of sector and country dummy variables, where 
the base case is taken to be the US Industrial and Consumer Products 
sector.  The table provides limited evidence in favor of sector effects on 
the ratio; the Chemicals sector has a ratio that is significantly below the 
level of the other sectors, but no other sector is statistically different from 
the base sector.  Country differences, however, are both large and 
significant (after controlling for industry effects).  Among the developed 
markets, 17 countries have mean ratios that exceed the level of the US 
base case.  For some of those, for example Ireland (27), Austria (26) and 
Spain (23), the differences are economically very large.  Note that no 
developed market has a ratio that is statistically below the level of the US.  
Among the emerging markets, 8 countries have ratios significantly above 
the level of the US; Indonesia has the largest difference (34), but the 
sample is small.  No emerging market has a ratio that is significantly 
below the level of the US. 
 
The regression was also estimated for the year 1995 (not reported).  The 
estimated coefficients for that year do not differ notably from those 
reported in the table.  One important difference, however, is in the 
amount of explained variation (R
2).  For the year 2000, reported in Table 
7, the regression explains less than 2 percent of the total variation in the 
data.  In contrast, for the year 1995 a similar regression explains 15 
percent of the variation.  This enormous difference in the two samples is 
also reflected in the sample statistics for the two periods.  The standard 
deviation of the ratio for the period 2000 was four times the level for the 
period 1995 globally.  Nearly all of the higher level of volatility is in 
emerging markets; the standard deviation in emerging markets increased 
by a factor of 8, compared to an increase of 55 percent in the developed 
markets.  
 
Closer scrutiny explains much of the difference between the 1995 and 
2000 samples. Regressions of the two groups of countries reveal that the 
developed market results do not change much between the two years, 
whereas the emerging market results differ notably. Breaking the EM 
sample down further one learns that most of the difference in the two 
years can be accounted for by a large shift in the distribution of the 
Korean population over this time period. That shift is documented in 
Figure 2. Apparently, Korean companies entered the mid-1990s with high 
levels of liabilities; for nearly 30 percent of the sample liabilities financed 
71-80 percent of total assets.  Following the 1998 crisis, however, Korean   21
companies de-levered their balance sheets, with that shift occurring 
across nearly the entire distribution of Korean companies. That 
de-leveraging, however, was accompanied by a high level of dispersion in 
the distribution of leverage ratios, accounting for much of the lower level 
of explanatory power in the year 2000 regression. 
 
Table 7.  Regression:  Total Liabilities/Total Assets on Relative Size, Sector and 
Country Dummies 2000 
 
 
 #  Obs  R
2       
 3360  0.014         
           
 Beta  T-Statistic         
Constant 49.29 36.39        
Size 2.55 5.59        
Chemicals -9.22 -2.71        
Food & Beverages  -2.85 -0.65        
Non-metallic Minerals  -4.34 -0.68        
Plastics & Rubber  3.21 0.68        
Primary Metals  -1.52 -0.32        
Pulp & Paper  -0.54 -0.14        
Textiles -4.32 -1.27       
           
Developed Markets       Emerging Markets    
AUSTRALIA 8.27 2.73   ARGENTINA  12.07  2.12
AUSTRIA 19.76 5.03   BRAZIL  13.98  2.80
BELGIUM 12.40 2.67   CHILE  -5.86  -1.42
BERMUDA 0.14 0.02   COLOMBIA  0.33  0.04
CANADA 13.71 1.70   CZECH   1.51  0.38
CAYMAN ISLANDS  -10.26 -1.13   HONG KONG  13.28  1.00
DENMARK 10.53 4.28   HUNGARY  -13.68  -2.12
FINLAND 11.09 3.14   INDIA  11.53  1.36
FRANCE 15.23 8.70   INDONESIA  38.41  3.32
GERMANY 18.64 10.93   ISRAEL  12.14  1.55
GREECE 8.00 1.99   KOREA  13.17  2.34
IRELAND 25.04 6.26   MALAYSIA  41.67  1.17
ITALY 18.24 6.76   MEXICO  9.80  2.53
JAPAN 11.05 5.74   PHILIPPINES  -13.63  -1.21
NETHERLANDS 14.93 4.46   SOUTH  AFRICA  11.43  1.97
NORWAY 11.66 2.08   TAIWAN  3.29  0.85
SINGAPORE 2.78 0.93   THAILAND  20.32  1.73
SPAIN 16.18 3.14   TURKEY  17.44  9.25
SWEDEN 6.19 2.39   VENEZUELA  -19.58  -3.82
SWITZERLAND 5.89 2.85        
UNITED KINGDOM  6.17 3.54        
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Current and Non-current Liabilities 
 
Globally, current liabilities represent about 30 percent of total assets, well 
above the 15 percent of total assets (in 2000) represented by non-current 
(or long-term) liabilities.  Current liabilities represent a combination of 
both trade and other non-market sources of credit, as well as the current 
portion of bank lending and bonds.  Non-current liabilities represent long- 
term credit from either banks or markets.  Together, these two ratios 
comprise the total liabilities/ total assets ratio reported in Table 6.  
Figure 2. Korea: Total Liabilities/Total Assets













The level of current liabilities is nearly equal in the two major subgroups 
of countries, with emerging market countries, on average, financing about 
30 percent of total assets with current liabilities, as compared to 28 
percent in developed markets (in 2000).  There is no apparent trend in the 
time series behavior of this ratio in the developed markets, however, there 
appears to be a tendency toward lower levels of current liabilities in the 
emerging markets over the sample period, falling steadily from 39 percent 
in 1994 to the current level. 
 
The non-current liabilities ratio, reported in Table 8, reveal a similar time 
pattern.  The ratio remained steady in the DM countries in the range 15-
18 percent, with no obvious time pattern.  In the EM countries, however, 
the ratio started out at a high of 19 percent and then declined following 
the 1997 crisis to 13 percent.  With the exception of the years 1998 and 
1994, the ratios in the two groups are statistically different at the 5 
percent level.  In a regression framework with size, sector and country   23
factors (not reported), however, the EM group average is not statistically 
different from the DM group average. 
 
Within the two country groups one observes considerable cross-sectional 
variation, with several countries in both groups producing single digit 
levels of non-current liabilities, including the most recent year for the 
UK, a country with a relatively well-developed domestic bond market and 
with a large number of reporting companies. Even the US, which has 
arguably the most developed corporate bond market in the world, not to 
mention a well capitalized and competitive banking sector, has 
non-current liabilities of only 13 percent in the year 2000, well below, for 
example, Brazil. 
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Table 8.  Median Non-current Liabilities/Total Assets (%) by Country and Year 
 
 
Developed Markets  2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
AUSTRALIA 21 23 22 22 20 18  20
AUSTRIA 25 29 33 38 39 40  45
BELGIUM 16 16 18 20 20 22  22
BERMUDA 3 3 6 5 5 7  8
CANADA 19 17 17 18 19 21  22
CAYMAN ISLANDS  16 17 13 12 13 9  9
DENMARK 18 20 17 18 20 19  19
FINLAND 23 24 26 26 23 28  32
FRANCE 20 19 19 20 21 21  23
GERMANY 31 32 33 37 38 38  39
GREECE 10 10 9 7 6 8  9
IRELAND 28 27 31 19 22 26  26
ITALY 18 18 18 19 18 19  22
JAPAN 14 15 15 13 14 18  20
NETHERLANDS 17 18 19 21 23 21  24
NORWAY 25 26 25 25 24 26  28
SINGAPORE 9 9 9 10 9 11  9
SPAIN 19 18 16 20 15 18  18
SWEDEN 26 27 27 22 21 20  22
SWITZERLAND 21 23 25 27 28 28  30
UNITED KINGDOM  9 10 11 10 10 10  10
UNITED STATES  13 16 14 12 12 14  15
Group Median  16 17 17 15 15 17  18
   
Emerging Markets   
ARGENTINA 10 9 9 21 16 11  15
BRAZIL 25 24 23 24 22 17 
CHILE 19 15 15 15 15 13  9
COLOMBIA 15 9 12 10 18 15  18
CZECH 2 5 6 7 3 3  1
HONG KONG  6 6 6 7 8 10  9
HUNGARY 4 6 5 3 5 8  16
INDIA 11 16 22 19 28 31  35
INDONESIA 46 11 11 19 14 16  15
ISRAEL 12 13 14 18 21 13  17
KOREA 14 17 20 24 23 22  23
MALAYSIA 9 7 8 7 7 8  8
MEXICO 32 27 26 29 28 27  31
PAKISTAN 16 13 17 15 12 16  10
PERU 9 9 10 12 17 6  2
PHILIPPINES 12 1 2 18 0 0  0
POLAND 13 7 5 4 3 0  0
SOUTH AFRICA  10 8 11 10 12 17  18
TAIWAN 17 16 15 14 19 15  8
THAILAND 20 17 10 16 16 17  8
TURKEY 10 10 13 17 13 11  8
VENEZUELA 18 14 11 14 15 18  29
Group Median  13 14 16 17 19 18  19
P-value (1)  0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.04  0.23
Global Median  15  16  16  16  16   17   18 
 
 
(1)  P-value reports the results of test for equality of medians for the two country groups.   
  P-values less than 0.05 reject equality at the 5 percent level. 
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In several other countries in the developed markets sample one sees much 
higher levels of non-current liabilities, particularly in Germany (31 
percent), with its bank-based financial system, in the Nordic countries, 
and in Austria and Ireland.  In emerging markets one finds relatively high 
levels of non-current liabilities in Mexico (32 percent), where the ratio 
has remained stable across the sample period, and in Brazil (25 percent), 
where the ratio increased rapidly following the currency stabilization 
program introduced in 1994.  In Korea, non-current liabilities have 
actually declined in importance following the 1997 crisis as companies 
deleveraged themselves; a somewhat similar pattern emerges in 
Indonesia, albeit with a twist in 2000 as the number of reporting 
companies dropped sharply. 
 
C. Asset Structure 
 
Asset structure, the relative amounts of fixed and current assets, can 
provide information on operational efficiency and the choice of 
technology.  However, disentangling these two dimensions is difficult.  
For example, high levels of current assets may suggest over-investment in 
inventory.  Alternatively, as explained more fully below, the combination 
of lower levels of fixed assets combined with high levels of human 
capital, which do not appear on the balance sheet, can produce the same 
result.  In this section we document the relative amounts of current and 
fixed assets used in our sample groups of countries. 
 
Current and Fixed Assets/Total Assets 
 
Current assets, which consist primarily of cash, liquid securities, 
inventory and trade receivables, comprise roughly half of all assets on a 
global basis, and this level of current assets has been maintained 
consistently across the sample period.  There is, however, considerable 
variation across the countries, with the developed market countries 
holding, on average, about 57 percent of their assets in this form, as 
opposed to a much lower level of 41 percent (in 2000) for the emerging 
markets. 
 
As the complement to current assets, fixed assets (Table 9) also represent 
about half of the total.  Here again, one sees the marked difference in the 
levels of the ratio in the two groups of countries, with emerging market 
countries holding much higher levels of fixed assets than their developed 
market counterparts.  This difference is highlighted by the remarkably 
low levels of fixed assets in two leading developed markets – the US and 
Germany – both of which had ratios below both the global and developed   26
market average.  The difference extends much deeper, however, as only 
four of the developed markets had fixed asset ratios in excess of 50 
percent (Australia, Canada, Cayman Islands and Ireland), with only three 
of the emerging markets having ratios below 50 percent. 
 
Differences between the countries might reflect sector effects, but 
regressions (not reported) that control for sector effects do not support 
that view.  For the year 2000, a regression of the ratio of fixed assets to 
total assets on country and industry variables shows that although sector 
effects are statistically significant, country effects are also significant.   
Specifically, among the emerging market countries, 8 countries had ratios 
that were statistically larger than the US, and only a single emerging 
market country – Turkey – had a ratio that was below the US.  Among 
developed markets, 2 countries had ratios above the US and 5 had ratios 
below the US.  Apparently, even controlling for sector effects the EM 
group held higher levels of fixed assets than the DM group and that 
difference was statistically significant. 
 
This result is at odds with one view of the world that posits higher levels 
of current assets in emerging markets as a result of poorer inventory 
management skills, combined with a need for precautionary balances of 
both cash and inventory.  The result could be consistent with a view that 
the reporting companies in the developed markets are more mature and 
that, therefore, their fixed assets are more fully depreciated, leaving them 
primarily with current assets on the balance sheet.  But that view fails to 
account for the fact that most companies are constantly investing and that 
depreciation actually does represent the consumption of capital over time, 
thereby requiring the acquisition of new and undepreciated equipment.  
What may be observed instead is a world in which highly skilled and 
highly paid labor in developed markets is acting as an additional form of 
capital, but one not counted on the balance sheet.  In contrast, the low 
wage unskilled worker in the emerging markets must be combined with 
higher levels of fixed assets. 
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Table 9.  Median Fixed Assets/Total Assets (%) by Country and Year 
 
 
Developed Markets  2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 
AUSTRALIA 54 58 52 52 52 54 51 
AUSTRIA 47 45 47 48 47 48 48 
BELGIUM 44 43 40 39 41 42 45 
BERMUDA 33 34 45 42 40 47 41 
CANADA 53 54 52 49 50 49 50 
CAYMAN ISLANDS  67 61 59 42 45 60 59 
DENMARK 43 42 42 40 36 40 40 
FINLAND 43 44 48 46 50 53 51 
FRANCE 32 31 32 32 34 34 34 
GERMANY 40 39 37 37 39 39 40 
GREECE 39 42 38 34 33 33 31 
IRELAND 55 53 45 41 44 45 46 
ITALY 35 37 37 37 33 32 36 
JAPAN 46 44 44 42 42 43 42 
NETHERLANDS 41 40 42 42 44 43 44 
NORWAY 44 41 42 43 43 44 45 
SINGAPORE 49 49 50 50 48 49 47 
SPAIN 48 54 52 52 53 55 54 
SWEDEN 41 43 46 41 42 41 38 
SWITZERLAND 44 46 46 46 45 44 45 
UNITED KINGDOM  42 43 38 35 35 35 37 
UNITED STATES  40 40 39 37 36 37 38 
Group Median  43 43 42 40 40 40 40 
   
Emerging Markets   
ARGENTINA 63 64 65 58 60 59 60 
BRAZIL 61 61 65 65 71 74  
CHILE 63 62 57 57 57 58 57 
COLOMBIA 74 80 75 78 84 82 78 
CZECH 55 55 54 54 58 54 58 
HONG KONG  46 45 45 45 45 45 43 
HUNGARY 52 54 53 40 46 46 47 
INDIA 67 63 57 57 50 48 48 
INDONESIA 67 64 57 62 57 57 53 
ISRAEL 28 34 38 40 45 48 49 
KOREA 50 51 52 48 49 47 48 
MALAYSIA 52 54 53 50 48 49 50 
MEXICO 69 69 72 72 73 71 73 
PAKISTAN 58 53 54 68 36 49 47 
PERU 60 56 56 52 56 51 58 
PHILIPPINES 62 54 48 68 64 61 57 
POLAND 52 51 53 49 47 44 40 
SOUTH AFRICA  42 41 39 42 44 44 40 
TAIWAN 63 62 61 61 64 60 65 
THAILAND 58 67 57 58 58 59 56 
TURKEY 29 39 40 37 29 29 28 
VENEZUELA 76 76 68 82 79 73 65 
Group Median  55 54 54 51 50 50 49 
P-value (1)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Global Median  45 45 45 43 42 42 42 
 
 
(1)  P-vale reports the results of test for equality of medians between the two countries.   
  P-values less than 0.05 reject equality at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 10.  Median Return on Assets (%) by Country and Year (Inflation adjusted) 
 
 
Developed Markets  2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
AUSTRALIA  2.8 4.5 4.4 6.5 4.9 3.3 5.4
AUSTRIA  5.1 4.6 4.3 4.5 3.6 3.5 1.3
BELGIUM  4.6 4.3 4.6 5.7 4.7 5.9 3.4
BERMUDA  4.8 4.9 1.4 5.1 3.9 1.6 4.0
CANADA  3.1 2.4 2.7 4.0 5.7 6.1 7.4
CAYMAN ISLANDS  2.4 0.1 2.5 2.2 7.3 3.4 10.9
DENMARK  3.8 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.8 6.9 6.0
FINLAND  5.7 6.1 5.2 7.3 6.6 5.9 4.9
FRANCE  4.9 5.0 4.4 4.6 4.2 4.2 3.6
GERMANY  4.3 4.3 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.1 2.0
GREECE  6.6 6.5 3.1 3.5 1.0 1.4 -2.2
IRELAND  2.9 7.5 5.7 8.5 9.1 7.4 7.0
ITALY  3.7 4.0 2.3 3.6 1.9 -0.1 -0.3
JAPAN  5.5 3.7 1.7 2.0 4.5 4.3 2.8
NETHERLANDS  6.0 5.0 5.8 6.7 6.8 6.9 5.0
NORWAY  0.9 1.9 3.2 3.8 6.9 6.4 7.2
SINGAPORE  5.8 6.8 5.1 3.9 5.6 5.2 5.1
SPAIN  4.6 5.0 5.3 5.2 4.6 3.2 2.4
SWEDEN  7.1 5.5 5.8 6.4 8.3 9.2 7.4
SWITZERLAND  7.4 6.6 6.5 7.1 6.4 5.2 5.5
UNITED KINGDOM  3.8 4.6 2.8 5.3 6.5 5.1 5.6
UNITED STATES  1.1 1.8 3.0 4.7 4.9 5.4 4.9
Group Median  4.2 3.7 2.7 3.7 4.9 4.8 4.3
   
Emerging Markets   
ARGENTINA  7.4 4.1 5.0 5.2 9.5 3.6 3.9
BRAZIL  -1.5 -0.1 0.0 -2.4 -10.9 -60.9 
CHILE  2.4 3.2 1.3 1.3 0.3 1.5 -1.3
COLOMBIA  -3.4 -7.9 -16.3 -14.7 -15.3 -16.2 -16.1
CZECH  0.5 0.2 -8.5 -5.1 -5.5 -6.1 -6.6
HONG KONG  10.0 9.5 0.6 0.4 2.1 -1.5 0.3
HUNGARY  0.9 -2.6 -6.4 -4.0 -3.7 -15.5 -6.9
INDIA  5.0 2.8 -7.8 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -1.2
INDONESIA  -11.1 -13.3 -55.7 -5.1 0.2 -2.1 -0.3
ISRAEL  4.6 -1.2 -1.3 -3.3 -4.1 -3.1 -5.9
KOREA  4.0 5.3 -4.5 -0.9 -0.1 0.5 -1.4
MALAYSIA  5.2 2.4 -2.3 4.4 5.3 5.5 4.7
MEXICO  0.7 -6.2 -7.6 -9.5 -21.3 -27.5 -5.7
PAKISTAN  5.1 -1.1 -0.7 -3.2 6.0 -1.7 -1.0
PERU  0.9 -1.5 -5.2 -4.7 -7.5 3.7 -2.6
PHILIPPINES  2.5 -3.1 -5.8 -0.9 1.2 1.5 -0.2
POLAND  -3.7 -2.4 -6.4 -6.6 -8.6 -17.0 -20.2
SOUTH AFRICA  5.0 3.6 1.7 0.8 2.7 1.3 -2.3
TAIWAN  5.1 6.4 3.3 6.1 5.8 4.0 5.1
THAILAND  5.5 5.6 0.5 -11.4 1.5 2.3 3.3
TURKEY  -43.0 65.5 -81.5 -71.9 -69.9 -74.0 -87.8
VENEZUELA  -12.0 -23.1 -33.4 -37.6 -87.1 -52.6 -58.3
Group Median  3.5 3.7 -3.9 -0.7 0.4 0.6 -0.6
P-Value (1)  0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Global Median  4.0 3.7 1.8 2.7 4.2 4.0 3.4
 
 
(1)  P-vale reports the results of test for equality of medians between the two countries.  
  P-values less than 0.05 reject equality at the 5 percent level. 
 
   29
D. Return on Assets and Equity 
 
Return on assets is of central importance in a market economy.   
Allocation of capital on the basis of risk and return is the basis for 
financial economics and has obvious policy implications.  In this section 
we examine the differences between the returns of the various countries 
and sectors in our sample. 
 
Ignoring potential impacts from various accounting standards on income 
calculation, note that a major difference across countries in calculating 
returns is the impact of local inflation. For that reason, the return statistics 
reported in both Tables 10 and 11 have been adjusted for the difference 
between the local rate of inflation and the US rate of inflation for the 
corresponding year, so that all returns are reported in US nominal terms.  
This adjustment does not account for currency movements, which could 
also be significant, because the reported returns are accounting returns, 
not market returns. Adjusting for the impact of currency movements on 
accounting returns is delicate and no obvious methodology is available. 
For that reason we rely on a simple inflation differential adjustment. 
 
 
The global median return on assets (inflation adjusted) has ranged from 
1.8 percent to 4.2 percent over the sample period (Table 10), with the 
high in 1996 and the low in 1998. The difference between the developed 
and emerging market median values is significantly different in all years 
except 1999, when they are equal. In all years except 1999 the EM returns 
are below the DM returns. Notably, returns in EM countries are near zero 
over 1994-97, with a sharp drop in 1998 as the Asia crisis both reduced 
nominal returns and increased inflation in several EM countries. Both the 
inflation and nominal return effects were transitory however, and EM 
returns increased in 1999-00. 
 
The variation across individual countries is more substantial. Note, in 
particular, the higher incidence of negative values in the emerging market 
sample, but also bear in mind that many of these countries have relatively 
small numbers of companies which should result in higher volatility in 
the median over time.  In a few countries one observes relatively low 
volatility – Australia, Denmark, France, Japan and Taiwan are examples – 
whereas in other countries higher volatility prevails – Italy and Mexico 
are examples.  Cyclical patterns are discernible; a slowdown in the 
returns provided by US companies is evident in 1998-00 after three years 
of higher returns.  In Malaysia one sees high returns through 1997, with 
lower returns in subsequent years, but a similar pattern is not obvious in   30
either Thailand or Korea, both countries that fell prey to the Asia crisis of 
1997. 
 
Differences at the country group level are also evident at the sector level, 
as reported in Figure 3, which shows the (inflation-adjusted) returns on 
assets for year 2000 for each of the 8 sectors for the two country groups.  
Returns in the DM sectors are consistently in the 4-5 percent range, with 
the notable exception of textiles, which returned just over 1 percent.   
There is considerably more variation in EM returns, although within the 
same range as the DM group.  In part because of the lower number of 
firms in the individual sectors, the differences between the two country 
groups are statistically significant only for Food, Nonmetallic Minerals 
and Metals, and in each of those cases the EM median is below that of the 
DM group.  EM group median returns exceed the DM group’s returns in 
four sectors, but those differences are not statistically significant. 
 
The median returns on equity (Table 11, inflation adjusted) reflect both 
changes in income over time as well as time variation in capital structure.  
Globally, returns peaked in 1995, dipped in 1998 and then recovered over 
1999-00.  Differences between the two country groups are significant, 
both statistically (in all years) and economically.  Returns in DM 
countries were high over 1994-97 approaching 10 percent in each year, 
compared to only about 6 percent in EM countries for the first three years 
falling to 3 percent in 1997.  The Asian crisis hit returns hard in the EM 
group in 1998, pushing them below zero, but recovery was both rapid and 
strong, with EM returns well above their DM counterparts in 1999.  A 
few countries have returns that exhibit low volatility over time – 
Australia and Singapore are examples – but many countries show 
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considerable volatility in returns – the US and Hong Kong are examples.  
Returns are quite high in a few countries, such as Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Argentina.  Low return values correspond closely with high levels of 
inflation, Turkey and Venezuela are good examples. 
 
Returns on both assets and equity have significant size, country and 
sector effects, but there is no difference, on average, between the 
(inflation-adjusted) returns (in 2000) in the two country groups after 
controlling for these factors.  In regressions, not reported, a large number 
of countries had country fixed effects that were significantly greater than 
the returns on the base country (the US).  Several sectors had significant 
fixed effects, relative to the base sector (industrial and consumer 
products), but those effects were all negative.  There was also a 
significant and positive size effect on returns.  None of these factors 
account for much of the variation in returns across firms, however, as the 
R2 of the regressions (for returns on assets) was a mere 1.1 percent, of 
which country factors account for the largest part by far. 
 
E. Financing Growth 
 
As companies grow their balance sheets through the acquisition of assets, 
they have choices to make in how that growth is financed.  Previous 
period earnings can be retained as a source of internal equity finance or 
paid to shareholders in the form of dividends.  External sources of finance 
include both the issuance of new shares – external equity – and the 
issuance of various debt instruments – liabilities.  The final choice 
between these various financing options will reflect the many factors 
discussed in Section II above.  Using the growth in the balance sheet over 
the period 1995-00 as the sample period, the financing of the growth in 
total assets is divided into these three components and expressed as a 
percentage of the change in total assets for the period.  The means of 
these three ratios, which sum to 100 percent for each country, the two 
country groups and the overall sample, are presented in Table 12.
12 
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Table 11.  Median Return on Equity (%) by Country and Year (Inflation Adjusted) 
 
 
Developed Markets  2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 
AUSTRALIA  7.3 9.7 8.5 11.8 8.8 7.8 10.5 
AUSTRIA  9.6 10.0 12.8 12.4 8.0 11.4 5.0 
BELGIUM  11.3 10.2 10.5 13.8 12.7 11.4 8.7 
BERMUDA  7.7 9.7 2.3 8.6 8.8 3.7 6.8 
CANADA  6.6 5.5 7.6 9.4 11.0 11.9 13.4 
CAYMAN ISLANDS  7.2 2.7 3.4 3.7 15.0 5.4 20.6 
DENMARK  8.9 11.7 12.2 11.3 12.5 12.5 12.2 
FINLAND  13.9 13.4 12.1 16.6 14.3 12.1 9.8 
FRANCE  10.7 11.4 11.0 11.9 10.2 9.6 8.9 
GERMANY  10.2 10.0 11.5 10.5 10.1 10.3 6.6 
GREECE  14.4 15.5 13.4 15.7 13.2 13.2 9.6 
IRELAND  14.0 20.6 17.1 19.5 19.1 19.6 16.9 
ITALY  9.4 10.2 8.5 9.5 7.7 5.4 3.6 
JAPAN  7.4 5.4 2.9 4.1 7.1 6.6 4.6 
NETHERLANDS  15.8 14.2 15.6 16.2 15.0 16.8 14.1 
NORWAY  1.9 5.6 9.6 11.3 13.2 16.2 17.1 
SINGAPORE  9.3 10.7 8.4 7.9 9.3 9.0 8.7 
SPAIN  11.6 11.8 11.7 11.6 9.5 10.8 7.2 
SWEDEN  13.6 11.4 13.3 13.1 15.3 19.6 18.4 
SWITZERLAND  14.1 13.6 13.4 14.7 12.6 10.8 11.2 
UNITED KINGDOM  7.4 9.4 8.2 11.5 13.5 11.9 11.9 
UNITED STATES  3.3 5.0 6.8 9.8 9.8 10.6 10.6 
Group Median  7.4 6.8 5.9 8.0 9.0 10.1 9.4 
    
Emerging Markets    
ARGENTINA  9.0 4.7 8.7 9.9 15.6 6.3 9.0 
BRAZIL  4.5 3.5 2.5 0.5 -9.0 -58.7  
CHILE  4.9 6.1 4.5 5.1 4.7 5.9 3.1 
COLOMBIA  -1.4 -6.8 -15.2 -14.2 -14.8 -15.3 -13.8 
CZECH  2.1 0.7 -8.1 -3.7 -4.6 -6.0 -6.2 
HONG KONG  14.0 14.0 5.0 6.6 9.0 3.2 7.9 
HUNGARY  4.3 2.1 -2.3 0.5 0.4 -6.9 1.8 
INDIA  11.1 9.2 -2.8 5.0 7.0 10.3 7.2 
INDONESIA  -39.0 11.9 -54.2 -5.2 8.5 6.7 7.1 
ISRAEL  8.4 1.6 4.4 1.4 0.1 2.3 -1.3 
KOREA  8.0 10.8 -0.5 2.2 4.5 6.4 4.4 
MALAYSIA  8.9 7.1 -0.2 9.5 11.7 12.5 11.6 
MEXICO  9.6 1.9 -2.8 1.3 -11.3 -23.1 -8.0 
PAKISTAN  14.3 25.0 12.5 6.1 20.7 8.4 17.9 
PERU  2.2 -1.0 -4.6 -2.7 -6.9 7.0 1.8 
PHILIPPINES  5.9 -2.9 -1.7 1.3 3.6 11.1 1.1 
POLAND  -1.3 0.3 -3.6 -4.0 -7.7 -15.6 -18.5 
SOUTH AFRICA  10.8 9.3 7.5 6.2 11.9 11.2 4.8 
TAIWAN  7.5 10.2 5.5 10.8 10.1 7.2 7.5 
THAILAND  12.9 10.4 15.9 -19.2 6.5 10.1 9.7 
TURKEY  -30.1 408.3 -78.3 -59.2 -58.0 -65.1 -75.8 
VENEZUELA  -11.4 -23.9 -32.6 -33.9 -82.8 -49.4 -58.4 
Group Median  7.3 8.4 -0.6 3.1 5.7 6.3 6.2 
P-Value (1)  0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Global Median  7.4 7.2 4.7 6.9 8.5 9.4 8.7 
 
 
(1)  P-vale reports the results of test for equality of medians between the two countries.  
P-values less than 0.05 reject equality at the 5 percent level.   33
  
Globally, liabilities accounted for 49 percent of total financing over the 5-
year period, which corresponds closely with the overall median value of 
total liabilities/total assets reported in Table 5 for each of the individual 
years.  Table 11 also tells us that, of the remaining 51 percent, internal 
equity sources represented 29 percent, with external equity equal to 22 
percent of the total. 
 
What is striking about Table 12 is the substantial difference in the 
patterns across the two groups of countries and across individual 
countries.  First, the use of liabilities to finance growth is much lower in 
the emerging markets, with that lower level offset by higher levels of 
both internal and external equity.  Note in particular that the use of 
external equity in emerging markets is well above the levels of the 
developed markets, which agrees with the findings of Domowitz, Glen 
and Madhavan (2001) on the level of development of primary equity 
markets.  Second, in some of the emerging markets the use of liabilities is 
extremely low.  In Korea, for example, few liabilities were used and 
growth was financed largely from external equity.  Korea is also a 
country where the leverage ratios declined notably over the period 1994-
00.  Third, in other countries the impact of the crisis makes the statistics 
more difficult to interpret.  In Indonesia there are only 6 companies in the 
sample and the average growth in total assets was limited owing to the 
poor economic environment.  In addition, neither internal nor external 
equity were significant sources of finance.  Moreover, foreign currency 
denominated liabilities increased significantly in value over the period as 
the exchange rate depreciated.  Hence, liabilities were the dominant 
source of finance for Indonesian companies over the period.   
 
Within the developed markets there was much lower variation across 
countries in the use of external liabilities, with the US having the lowest 
propensity (after Bermuda) for liabilities (47 percent), which corresponds 
with its low level of liabilities on its balance sheet.  Other countries 
employed much higher levels of liability financing.  Ireland had the 
highest level among the group (76 percent, ignoring the Cayman Islands), 
followed by Denmark (72 percent), Italy and Spain (68 percent each). 
 
There was also great variation across countries in both groups in the use 
of external equity.  One country in the sample actually decreased the 
amount of external equity employed, but that country, Spain, had a small 
number of companies in the sample and one of those was an outlier with a 
small decrease in the value of total assets, which then translates a positive 
change in external equity into a negative ratio.  Deleting that outlier   34
produces an external finance ratio of 3 percent.  The largest user of 
external equity was an emerging market country – Korea – where nearly 
half of all growth was financed from that source over the period.  In 
contrast, external equity financed 21 percent of growth in the US, the 
world’s largest and most developed equity market, a level comparable to 
that of the Emerging Market average and below that of 5 Emerging 
Market countries for this period. 
 
Table 12.  Financing Sources: 1995-00 (% of Change in Total Assets) 
 
 
Developed Markets  Liabilities  Ext EQ  Int EQ  Emerging Markets  Liabilities  Ext EQ  Int EQ
AUSTRALIA  58% 32% 11% ARGENTINA  46% 16% 38%
AUSTRIA 52%  3% 45% BRAZIL  74%  11% 15%
BELGIUM 56%  6% 38% CHILE  44%  33% 23%
BERMUDA  41% 23% 36% COLOMBIA  73% 16% 11%
CANADA  56% 32% 12% CZECH    33% 21% 46%
CAYMAN 
ISLANDS 
90% 8% 2% HONG  KONG  44%  20% 35%
DENMARK  72% 6% 23% HUNGARY  28% 1% 71%
FINLAND 53%  26% 22% INDIA  53%  5% 43%
FRANCE 61%  7% 31% INDONESIA  110%  12% -23%
GERMANY  62% 5% 33% ISRAEL  54% 6% 40%
GREECE  52% 34% 14% KOREA  27% 48% 25%
IRELAND 76%  5% 18% MALAYSIA  40%  18% 42%
ITALY 68%  5% 27% MEXICO  61%  30% 10%
JAPAN 62%  6% 32% PHILIPPINES  34%  17% 49%
NETHERLANDS 65%  9% 26% SOUTH  AFRICA  49%  10% 41%
NORWAY  50% 23% 27% TAIWAN  59% 40% 1%
SINGAPORE  66% 15% 19% THAILAND  74% 11% 15%
SPAIN 68%  -9% 40% 1TURKEY 61%  18% 21%
SWEDEN 57%  4% 39% VENEZUELA  27%  54% 19%
SWITZERLAND 54%  7% 39%    
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
52% 21% 27%    
UNITED STATES  47%  21% 32%    
      
Group  Average  53% 17% 30%   35% 39% 27%
      
Global Average  49%  22% 29%        
 
 
Filter: Companies are excluded if any of their ratios are outside [-200,+200] 
Sample Size: 3,360 
 
1.  Spain has 18 companies, one of which experienced a small decline in total assets over 1995-
00.  That company also saw external equity increase, which resulted in a large negative value 
for the external equity ratio.  Excluding that one company, the sample mean of the ratio is 3%; 
the internal equity ratio would decline accordingly. 
 
One point to bear in mind when interpreting these financing ratios is the 
relative amounts of capital being raised from the various sources.  Over 
the sample period the rate of growth, measured in Dollar terms, was 
actually lower in the EM group than the DM group.  The average of the 
country growth rates was 18 percent in the EM group, compared to 28   35
percent for the DM group.  Hence, the EM group had less growth to 
finance, which might help to account for their ability to finance more of 




The main empirical results of the paper may be summarised as follows: 
 
1. regarding size as measured by total assets, there is no significant 
difference in the distribution of EM and DM firms in our sample; 
country effects explain more of the inter-firm variation in the 
distribution of size than do sector effects; and over the sample 
period the relationship between size and firm growth was broadly 
the same in the two groups of countries.   
2. regarding firm leverage, EM firms have lower levels of leverage 
than do DM firms; the use of current liabilities is much the same in 
the two groups of countries; current liabilities finance a larger 
portion of total assets than do long-term liabilities in both groups of 
countries; and neither country nor sector factors explain much of 
the inter-firm variation in leverage.   
3. regarding asset structure, the EM firms employ a higher level of 
fixed assets than do their DM counterparts.   
4. regarding returns on assets and equity, returns are similar across 
the two groups of countries, although there appears to be more 
volatility of returns for EM firms.   
5.  regarding the financing of growth, EM firms’ use of external equity 
finance is higher than that of DM firms; the latter use higher levels 
of liabilities; and the use of internal finance is similar between the 
two groups of countries.   
6. country effects account for more of the variation in all variables 
than do either sector or size effects, but individual firm effects 
account for most of the variation. 
 
Although these results may be regarded as sample specific, they 
nevertheless raise certain broad issues that merit policy discussion.  First, 
one finding that stands out above all others is the importance of the stock 
market in financing the growth of EM firms.  This suggests that stock 
market development in these countries has been important.  However, 
whether further development of the stock market should take place and 
the form that it takes may depend on the particular circumstances of each 
country and should be the subject of serious policy discussion.  Second, 
the finding that EM firms use lower levels of liabilities to finance their 
balance sheets suggests that policy makers may need to spend more time   36
on the development of credit markets.  However, it could also mean that 
policies that reduce the riskiness of the environment within which EM 
firms operate could accomplish the same goal.  Third, we find that, 
contrary to a priori expectations, there are far fewer differences between 
the EM and DM firms than one would expect.  Consequently, the view 
that EM firms are less subject to competition and market forces may not 
be valid.  Indeed, our own research, Glen Lee and Singh (2001 and 2002), 
indicates that the intensity of competition in some EM countries is at 
levels similar to those found in DM countries.  In order to maintain a 
competitive environment, policy makers will need to concentrate not only 
on capital structure and corporate finance issues, but also on competition 
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Notes 
 
1   See, for example, Pomerleano (1999), Greenspan (1998) and Summers 
(1998).  For critical views of this hypothesis see Singh (2000) and 
Stiglitz (2000). 
 
2   For fuller discussion of these issues see Singh, Singh and Weiss 
(2002). 
 
3   Laffont (1999) suggests product market competition in emerging 
markets to be highly imperfect.  For a different perspective, see Glen, 
Lee and Singh (2001, 2002).  For a review of these issues see Tybout 
(2000).  On capital market imperfections in general in emerging 
markets, see Singh (1997).  On groups and conglomerates see Leff 
(1977), Singh (1995) and Khanna (2000).  On implications of 
regulatory and legal inadequacies in emerging markets see Shleifer 
and Wolfenzon (2002).  On ownership patterns see Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000). 
 
4   Inflation accounting in some EMs is well developed.  For example, 
Whittington et al (1997) show that the Brazilian method of inflation 
adjustment deals effectively with the problem. 
 
5   The division into developed and emerging markets is based on the 
system employed by Standard and Poor’s (2000), which follows the 
system originally developed by IFC in its Emerging Markets 
Database. 
 
6   The sample used in this and the following regressions differs slightly 
from the sample used in the other tables.  There are two dimensions to 
this difference.  First, the main objective was to produce data for the 
financing regressions reported later, which require data for both years, 
1995 and 2000; this eliminates 3,863 companies that did not have data 
for both years.  Second, to avoid the impact of a few outliers on the 
results, the sample excludes 749 companies (18 percent of the sample) 
where the ratio of financing from any source to total assets exceeds 
200 percent. 
 
7   Roberts et al (2002) argue that competition in Taiwan and Korea is 
different and that Taiwan is more competitive. 
 
8   See Caves (1998) for a recent review article on the law of 
proportionate effects and modern theory about size distribution.   38
 
 
9   The other things equal clause is important here since entry and exit 
patterns could, in principle, reverse the growth of industrial 
concentration.  These phenomena have not been examined here. 
 
10  Myers (2001) reviews the literature on capital structure. 
 
11  The size factor is  1n (company total assets/global mean total assets). 
 
12  As mentioned in an earlier note, the sample used in this analysis is 
smaller than the sample used in most of the other tables.  In particular, 
note that the largest outliers (as measured by the size of their financing 
ratios) have been eliminated, which permits one to use mean values, 
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